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JULIET S. SORENSEN AND DAVID H. HOFFMAN, PUBLIC CORRUPTION AND 
THE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (WEST ACADEMIC 2017).  894 PP. 
INTRODUCTION 
Corruption in America is an evolving concept.  What it means has been, 
and remains, a source of fierce debate,1 as is the law’s place in regulating it.2  
As political developments in America over recent years have shown, these 
debates are intensely significant for the future of American governance.  An 
overarching theme of the 2016 election was corruption and its relationship to 
inequality: whom has the American political establishment helped, and to 
 
* Assistant Professor, Temple University Beasley School of Law.  Thanks to Juliet Sorensen 
for helpful comments, Osazenoriuwa Ebose and Casey James for research assistance, and the 
editors of the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology.  And thanks to the authors of this 
terrific book for inviting me to review it. 
1  See, e.g., Deborah Hellman, Defining Corruption and Constitutionalizing Democracy, 
111 MICH. L. REV. 1385, 1387–90 (2013) (observing that “the Court has vacillated between 
expansive and restrictive conceptions of corruption” and has failed to reconcile the tension 
between cases involving gerrymandering and apportionment, which “defin[e] the proper 
legislative role,” and those involving campaign finance, which “defin[e] corruption of that 
role”); Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Foreword, Fighting Corruption in America and Abroad, 
84 FORDHAM L. REV. 407, 408 (2015) (setting out the debate between narrow and broad 
definitions of the concept).  
2  Shugerman, supra note 1, at 408–09 (discussing how the Court’s narrower definition of 
corruption has limited law’s regulation largely to quid pro quo corruption). 
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whose benefit?3  In Donald Trump, Americans elected a candidate who 
campaigned on, among other things, “draining the swamp” and returning 
political power to the “people.”4  At the same time, Trump’s financial 
holdings and business entanglements present conflicts of interest 
unprecedented in the history of the American Presidency.5 
In short, we are in a pivotal moment for the study of corruption in 
America.  And so it is that Public Corruption and the Law,6 the first 
comprehensive collection of cases and materials geared towards law 
students’ study of corruption, arrives not a moment too soon.  If it only filled 
this gaping hole in the casebook offerings, David Hoffman and Juliet 
Sorensen’s book would be worthwhile.  But it does more.  Through its 
selection and presentation of materials, the book implicitly advances two 
 
3  See Sarah Chayes, It Was a Corruption Election. It’s Time We Realized It., FOREIGN 
POL’Y (Dec. 6, 2016), http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/06/it-was-a-corruption-election-its-
time-we-realized-it-trump-united-states/ (noting that, as candidates, Donald Trump and Bernie 
Sanders each “made the word ‘corruption’ central to their campaigns,” and arguing that the 
2016 election heralds America’s membership in a growing list of nations in which embedded 
structural corruption has contributed to the rise of political extremism); Michael Pollard & 
Joshua Mendelsohn, RAND Kicks off 2016 Presidential Election Panel Survey, RAND BLOG 
(Jan. 27, 2016), http://www.rand.org/blog/2016/01/rand-kicks-off-2016-presidential-election-
panel-survey.html (explaining that a survey of Republican primary voters found respondents 
nearly 90% more likely to favor Donald Trump if they agreed with the statement, “people like 
me don’t have any say about what the government does,” and that such preference was 
statistically significant “over and beyond any preferences based on respondent gender, age, 
race/ethnicity, employment status, educational attainment, household income, attitudes 
towards Muslims, attitudes towards illegal immigrants, or attitudes towards Hispanics.”). 
4  See Russell Berman, Donald Trump’s Last-Ditch Plan to Drain the Swamp, ATLANTIC 
(Oct. 18, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/10/donald-trumps-plan-
to-drain-the-swamp/504569/ (describing specifics of Trump’s campaign pledge, which 
revolved primarily around efforts to limit lobbying by former government officials); Sarah 
McCammon, Annotation, President Trump’s Inaugural Address, Annotated, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO (Jan. 20, 2017), http://www.npr.org/2017/01/20/510629447/watch-live-president-
trumps-inauguration-ceremony (“Trump’s inaugural speech strongly echoes the themes that 
were central to his campaign: a populist, anti-establishment message combined with a promise 
to transfer power to ‘the people.’ Trump tapped into a feeling among many voters that the 
political system was broken and the Washington establishment was not serving them.”). 
5  See Walter M. Shaub, Jr., Director, U.S. Off. of Gov. Ethics, Remarks at the Brookings 
Institution (Jan. 11, 2017), available at https://www.brookings.edu/events/white-house-
ethics-experts-repond-to-donald-trumps-announcement/ (explaining how Trump’s business 
holdings and failure to divest from them creates conflicts of interest unprecedented for the 
office of the presidency); Jeremy Venook, Trump’s Interests vs. America’s, Dubai Edition, 
ATLANTIC (Aug. 9, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/08/donald-
trump-conflicts-of-interests/508382/ (detailing fifty-three different business dealings of 
Trump’s that raise serious conflict-of-interest problems).  
6  JULIET S. SORENSEN & DAVID H. HOFFMAN, PUBLIC CORRUPTION AND THE LAW: CASES 
AND MATERIALS (2017).  
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important arguments. 
First, the book’s authors stake their place squarely on one side of the 
debate over corruption’s definition.  The book covers not just the classic, quid 
pro quo corruption of public officials, but also structural corruption within 
the broader political process, through abuses of campaign finance, patronage, 
and redistricting.  Second, the book functions as a compelling argument for 
teaching corruption as a stand-alone law school course.  When domestic 
public corruption is taught as a part of a course on something else—white 
collar crime, compliance, or international business regulation, for example—
students miss the unique and confounding regulatory challenge that 
corruption presents.  By seeing the full panoply of laws and processes that 
regulate public corruption, students can appreciate how regulatory modalities 
interrelate.  They can see how courts’, legislatures’, and enforcers’ choices 
among these regulatory modalities affect which forms of corruption are 
constrained and which are left unimpeded.  And they learn to appreciate how 
these choices ultimately influence democratic governance. 
In this Review, I will elaborate on these implicit themes of the book and 
advance them more directly.  Part I provides an overview of the book’s broad 
approach.  The book covers the full spectrum of conduct constituting abuse 
of official power for personal benefit—from the classic criminal prosecutions 
of quid pro quo corruption, to structural corruption of the political process, 
to corruption abroad, to corruption within legally-insulated institutions 
(police departments, the military, Congress, and the White House).  It also 
surveys the theoretical debates on what, exactly, corruption is.  This Part 
articulates the key insights enabled by such a holistic approach: corruption in 
all its varied forms, and the regulation of corruption, is a system—a set of 
interrelated, responsive forces.7  A change in one part of that system—for 
instance, a reduction or enlargement of one form of corruption or regulatory 
modality—has cascading effects on the others. 
In service of these insights, Part II argues for teaching domestic public 
corruption holistically, as a stand-alone course, rather than compartmentally 
through other courses (for instance, on white collar crime or campaign 
finance law).  It is only by examining the full panoply of available regulatory 
modalities (criminal, civil, electoral) and the cascading effects that ensue 
when any one of those regulatory modalities is relaxed, that students will 
appreciate the regulatory challenge public corruption presents.  Yet, as an 
empirical examination of law school course offerings reveals, few law 
 
7  DONELLA H. MEADOWS, THINKING IN SYSTEMS 2 (Diana Wright, 1st ed. 2008) 
(theorizing dynamics of regulation in systems, described as “a set of things . . . interconnected 
in such a way that they produce their own pattern of behavior over time”).  
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schools teach domestic public corruption in this manner.8  This curricular 
omission is problematic.  It is only by understanding public corruption and 
its regulation as a system that students can appreciate the unique regulatory 
challenge corruption presents.  As the next generation of American lawyers, 
elected officials, judges, policymakers, and engaged citizens, it is our 
students who must understand that challenge, if our society is ever to rise to 
it. 
I. DEFINING PUBLIC CORRUPTION BROADLY 
What is public corruption?  This is the most pressing question in 
corruption scholarship and doctrine because its answer determines how law 
should regulate public officials’ actions.9  Few would contest that a public 
official acts corruptly when he wields the power of his office in return for a 
personal benefit: the so-called “quid pro quo.”10  But what about less clearly 
transactional, but still undesirable, forms of influence—such as when a public 
official accepts gifts or campaign donations from interested persons or 
entities seeking to curry favor, or when a public official seeks to alter the 
structures of governance in ways that will benefit her own (or her party’s 
own) continued electoral success?  If we define corruption in a way that 
excludes these sorts of actions, we necessarily limit law’s power to regulate 
them. 
In this respect, defining corruption is fundamentally about defining 
law’s role in the regulation of the democratic process.  And law’s role in this 
space is not self-evident.  Democracy in a pluralistic society necessarily 
produces winners and losers, conferring power to one at the expense of the 
other.  To what extent should law regulate the contest and the benefits power 
confers?  And how should courts and legislatures set the parameters of legal 
regulation? 
Sorensen and Hoffman present this existential thicket at the outset.  
They preface their case materials with a collection of readings that lays bare 
the difficulty of defining corruption, as well as the unique problems of 
identifying and measuring conduct that undermines the very institutions 
tasked with rooting it out.  For instance, what distinguishes a gift from a 
 
8  See infra note 63 and accompanying text (finding just thirteen schools that teach 
anything arguably fitting a stand-alone, holistic examination of public corruption and its 
regulation).   
9  Shugerman, supra note 1, at 408. 
10  See generally, Richard L. Hasen, Why Isn’t Congress More Corrupt? A Preliminary 
Inquiry, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 429 (2015) (drawing implicit distinction between quid pro quo 
“corruption” by legislators and other forms of outside influence).  
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bribe?11  How can we measure corruption’s prevalence and effects within 
economies?12  And how is corruption exposed and prosecuted?13  These 
materials are richly drawn from across disciplines, presenting corruption’s 
challenges from the vantage point of political science, economics, and 
prosecution.  The readings also effectively demonstrate the stakes of the 
enterprise, demonstrating the ways in which corruption affects governance 
and the rule of law, economic growth, and the legitimacy of institutions. 
Within these materials the authors devote a fair amount of attention to 
the case-fixing scandal that rocked the Cook County court system in the early 
1980s, in which a years-long undercover FBI investigation known as 
Operation Greylord resulted in ninety-seven convictions of judges, lawyers, 
and other court personnel for federal crimes including fraud, extortion, and 
bribery.14  The excerpts provided—from appellate decisions upholding two 
of the convictions—provide a piercing illustration of corruption’s effects and 
the intense resources required to successfully expose and combat it. 
The Greylord materials bring to mind a more recent example of judicial 
corruption in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania (not included in the book), in 
which two judges accepted millions of dollars in bribes from for-profit 
juvenile detention center owners in return for sentencing thousands of 
children to long terms of confinement in those centers.15  It is not only their 
courthouse locus that makes both the Greylord and Luzerne County scandals 
so notable, but that they continued for years in plain sight—with many 
institutional actors aware of the corruption, but hard-pressed to stop it.16  It is 
cases like these that crystallize why public corruption crimes pose such a 
unique threat and investigatory challenge, a theme the authors revisit in more 
detail in a later chapter.17 
The Operation Greylord materials are a perfect segue to the book’s 
 
11  SORENSEN & HOFFMAN, supra note 6, at 12–21, as excerpted in Susan Rose-Ackerman, 
Bribes, Patronage and Gift-Giving, in SUSAN ROSE ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND 
GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND REFORM (1999). 
12  Id. at 21–32, as excerpted in William Easterly, Corruption and Growth, in WILLIAM 
EASTERLY, THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR GROWTH: ECONOMISTS’ ADVENTURES AND 
MISADVENTURES IN THE TROPICS (2001)). 
13  Id. at 32–45 (excerpts of cases arising from the federal investigation of the Cook County 
judicial system in the late 1970s and early 1980s). 
14  Id.  
15  Ian Urbina, Despite Red Flags About Judges, a Kickback Scheme Flourished, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 27, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/28/us/28judges.html?_r=1 (this has 
become commonly known as the “Kids for Cash” scandal). 
16  Id.; SORENSEN & HOFFMAN, supra note 6, at 32. 
17  SORENSEN & HOFFMAN, supra note 6, at ch. 5, Section II (discussing the unique 
challenges of investigating public corruption, and providing selected scholars’ prescriptions 
for how to mitigate them). 
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second chapter, on traditional bribery, extortion, and fraud.  The chapter is 
titled “Individual Public Corruption,” as distinguished from the sort of 
structural influence-peddling the book covers in its later section on 
patronage, campaign finance, and electoral redistricting.18  The “individual” 
descriptor has been elsewhere used for the same distinguishing purpose,19 but 
it is somewhat of a misnomer.  Many cases of traditional graft, including 
those covered in the chapter,20 involve a group of public officials whose 
collective conduct comprises systemic corruption within a public institution, 
and often reflects a broader institutional culture of corruption.21  (And some 
cases covered in later chapters of Sorensen and Hoffman’s book, for instance, 
those for violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, involve discrete 
corrupt acts by individual defendants.22) 
What distinguishes the subject of the second chapter from the remainder 
of the book, then, is less who has committed the corrupt acts than which laws 
those acts implicate: all involve statutory crimes with common law roots.  
These are the “classic” corruption cases involving fraud, extortion, and 
bribery.  And indeed, the Court has drawn on the common-law origins of 
these statutes when interpreting them.23 
The point is not to quibble about nomenclature, but to raise a broader 
 
18  Id. at ch. 3. 
19  See, e.g., Shugerman, supra note 1, at 408 (distinguishing between “the intuitive image 
of individual corruption—such as quid pro quo bribery—and the deeper structural problem of 
institutional corruption”). 
20  See, e.g., SORENSEN & HOFFMAN, supra note 6, at 71–76, as excerpted in United States 
v. Alfisi, 308 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2002) (systemic bribery among USDA inspectors at the Hunt’s 
Point Terminal Market in New York); id. at 113–16, as excerpted in United States v. Massey, 
89 F.3d 1433 (11th Cir. 1996) (systemic corruption among judges and laws in the Circuit Court 
of Dade County, Florida); id. at 175–88, as excerpted in Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 
(1992) (widespread corruption in property rezoning process in the Atlanta metro area). 
21  The chapter also includes cases involving lone wolf corrupt officials.  See, e.g., id. at 
62–70, as excerpted in United States v. Ganim, 510 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2007) (corrupt acts by 
Mayor of Bridgeport, Connecticut); id. at 84–90, as excerpted in United States v. Blagojevich, 
794 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 2015) (corrupt acts by Governor of Illinois); id. at 92–110, as excerpted 
in McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (alleged corrupt acts by Governor of 
Virginia). 
22  See, e.g., id. at 506–10, as excerpted in SEC v. Straub, 921 F. Supp. 2d 244 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013) (involving allegations against three executives of a telecommunications company for 
violations of the FCPA). 
23  See Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992) (interpreting Hobbs Act extortion 
statute in relation to common law definition of extortion), as excerpted in SORENSEN & 
HOFFMAN, supra note 6, at 146–58; McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987) 
(interpreting mail fraud statute in reference to common law understanding of fraud as limited 
to deprivations of property rights); id. at 369–75 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (disputing that mail 
fraud statute maps onto common law fraud), as excerpted in SORENSEN & HOFFMAN, supra 
note 6, at 209–23.  
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concern about framing.  By labeling these cases as “individual” corruption, 
we shortchange the structural features within institutions that give rise to quid 
pro quo corruption.24  And by glossing over the common-law origins of these 
particular crimes, we overlook an important constraint within the laws 
themselves: these crimes were defined, by both courts and legislatures, long 
before the explosion of money in politics.25  They are, in this sense, relics of 
a different political and regulatory era. 
Seen in this light, the second chapter materials reveal the difficulty of 
distinguishing criminal corruption from standard operating procedure in the 
modern political era.  It is precisely this difficulty that renders statutory 
interpretation in these cases an exercise in influence-peddling relativism.  If 
liability for extortion could be predicated on campaign contributions without 
proof of a quid pro quo, what prevents an elected official’s criminal 
conviction for supporting legislation furthering the interests of constituent 
donors?26  If liability under the federal gratuity statute required proof merely 
of a gift given because of the recipient’s official position, what would prevent 
prosecution of a winning sports team invited to the White House from gifting 
the President with a replica team jersey?27  If liability under the federal 
bribery statute can be predicated on informal exercises of influence—for 
instance, setting up meetings, talking with officials, or organizing events—
what prevents the prosecution of an elected official for simply responding to 
 
24  See, e.g., Zephyr Teachout, Legalized Bribery, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/26/opinion/zephyr-teachout-on-sheldon-silver-
corruption-and-new-york-politics.html (“The structure of private campaign finance has 
essentially pre-corrupted our politicians, so that they can’t even recognize explicit bribery 
because it feels the same as what they do every day.”).  
25  According to data from the Campaign Finance Institute, between 1974 and 2014, 
spending on Senate races increased by over $250 million, a growth of 882%.  Senate 
Campaign Expenditures: Major Party General Election Candidates, 1974–2016, Campaign 
Fin. Inst., http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/vital/VitalStats_t5.pdf (last visited Jan. 16, 2018). In that 
same time, spending on House races increased by over $378 million, a growth of 859%. House 
Campaign Expenditures: Major Party General Election Candidates, 1974–2016, Campaign 
Fin. Inst., http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/vital/VitalStats_t2.pdf (last visited Jan. 16, 2018).  
26  See McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 272 (1991) (reversing a state 
legislator’s extortion conviction predicated on payments made to him by constituents who 
stood to benefit from legislator’s sponsorship of certain legislation, noting that criminalizing 
such payments without proof of a quid pro quo “would open to prosecution . . . conduct that 
in a very real sense is unavoidable so long as election campaigns are financed by private 
contributions”), as excerpted in SORENSEN & HOFFMAN, supra note 6, at 163. 
27  See United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 414 (1999) 
(reversing conviction of trade association for illegal gratuities, predicated on gifts made to 
U.S. Agriculture Secretary, where prosecution made no showing that gifts were given for or 
because of any particular official act), as excerpted in SORENSEN & HOFFMAN, supra note 6, 
at 133. 
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constituent concerns, if the constituent has given campaign contributions or 
other gifts in the past?28 
Of course, each of these scenarios (all hypothesized by the Supreme 
Court in service of narrower statutory construction), are a far cry from the 
actual conduct at issue in the given case at hand.  None of those cases (or 
others, for that matter) involved such unremarkable conduct; federal 
prosecutors have, by and large, prosecuted officials for clearly undesirable 
and uncommon acts.29  Yet the slippery slope concerns that surface 
repeatedly in the Chapter Two cases are all of a piece—a judicial recognition 
of, and deference to, the realities of our representative democracy.30 
The most troublesome of those realities are the subject of the book’s 
third chapter on patronage and campaign finance.  The authors’ juxtaposition 
of Chapters Two and Three puts the challenge of corruption regulation in 
sharp relief.  If courts are hesitant to police corruption too robustly at the 
back-end (by way of criminal sanctions for past transgressions), then 
regulation must lie at the front-end—by way of monitoring and limiting the 
financial access of those who would exert corrupting influence.  And yet, as 
the materials in the third chapter show, the Supreme Court has in recent years 
eschewed front-end regulation, too. 
The Chapter Three materials are detailed and thorough.  They begin with 
the history of patronage systems and the machine politics of the early 
twentieth century.  The authors then provide a history of campaign finance 
regulation through the key statutes and Supreme Court cases interpreting 
them.  Through this overview, the reader can trace the doctrinal origins of 
First Amendment constraints on campaign finance regulation,31 the 
constitutional significance of distinguishing campaign contributions from 
 
28  See McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (reversing bribery conviction 
of state governor predicated on gifts given ostensibly in return for the governor’s arranging 
meetings, organizing events, and speaking with other officials—all, without more, falling short 
of “official acts”), as excerpted in SORENSEN & HOFFMAN, supra note 6, at 92. 
29  See, e.g., McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2375, as excerpted in SORENSEN & HOFFMAN, supra 
note 6, at 110 (“There is no doubt that this case is distasteful; it may be worse than that.  But 
our concern is . . . with the broader legal implications of the Government’s boundless 
interpretation of the federal bribery statute.”); Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. at 408 
(“When . . . the giving of gifts by reason of the recipient’s mere tenure in office constitutes a 
violation, nothing but the Government’s discretion prevents the foregoing examples [as 
distinguished from the more serious charged conduct] from being prosecuted.”), as excerpted 
in SORENSEN & HOFFMAN, supra note 6, at 138. 
30  See Teachout, supra note 24. 
31  See SORENSEN & HOFFMAN, supra note 6, at 307–19 (discussing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1 (1976), and its legacy equating political spending and constitutionally protected 
speech). 
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expenditures,32 and the Court’s narrowing conception of the government’s 
interest in campaign finance regulation.33  The doctrinal arc the authors 
present culminates in a detailed, forty-page distillation of the Citizens United 
v. Federal Election Commission34 opinion (no mean feat on a decision that 
clocks in at 183 pages).35  The authors helpfully present that case through 
excerpts of each of the opinions (majority, concurrence, and dissent) 
interspersed with explication and analysis.  In all, Sorensen and Hoffman do 
a tremendous job explaining the long, convoluted history of campaign 
finance law in America. 
The chapter then considers an alternative theory of state interest in 
campaign finance regulation, apart from combatting corruption: so-called 
“equalization,” the idea of leveling the playing field of electoral politics.36  
However laudable as a policy goal, equalization has proven an inadequate 
theory for winning campaign finance cases.37  More recently, some scholars 
have suggested an alternative state interest in campaign finance reform, 
rooted in ensuring greater political participation.38  Reforms aimed at 
enhancing political participation seek not to curtail political expenditures, but 
rather to expand the number of people making them.39  It remains to be seen 
 
32  See SORENSEN & HOFFMAN, supra note 6, at 307–47. 
33  Compare McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 150 (2003) (conceiving broadly of Congress’ 
regulatory interest in preventing “undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment,” or even 
“the appearance of such influence”), with Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) 
(declining to uphold regulation aimed at limiting purchased “ingratiation and access”). 
34  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 361–62 (holding unconstitutional federal campaign finance 
law restricting political expenditures by corporations as violating corporations’ First 
Amendment rights to make political speech). 
35  See SORENSEN & HOFFMAN, supra note 6, at 404–44. 
36  For scholarly articulations of this theory, see, e.g., Richard Briffault, Public Funding 
and Democratic Elections, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 563, 577–78 (1999) (“[D]ramatically unequal 
campaign spending that reflects underlying inequalities of wealth is in sharp tension with the 
one person, one vote principle enshrined in our civic culture and our constitutional law.”); 
Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense 
of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1, 27–28 (1996) (stating that “egalitarian 
pluralism aims to equalize the ability of different individuals to affect the political process,” 
based on the theory that “disparities in wealth and ability to organize are not relevant to the 
individual’s right to influence political outcomes”). 
37  See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 350 (“But Buckley [v. Valeo] rejected the premise that 
the Government has an interest ‘in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to 
influence the outcome of elections.’” (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976))).  
38  See generally Spencer Overton, The Participation Interest, 100 GEO. L.J. 1259 (2012) 
(arguing in favor of campaign finance reform focused on increasing political participation by 
a broader portion of the electorate). 
39  Id. at 1263 (advocating reforms such as a $100 tax credit for political contributions, 
donor matching funds, and relaxation of some of the restrictions around political action 
committees).  
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whether such reforms will be adopted and, if so, what the Court will do in the 
event they are challenged. 
Chapter Three also covers the issue of corruption in judicial elections, 
an area in which the Court has been far more willing to exert regulatory 
muscle than it has in the field of legislative and executive elections.40  It ends 
with consideration of redistricting and gerrymandering.  These practices, 
though lawful under federal law as of this writing,41 nevertheless present 
problems of abuse of power and improper influence.  Partisan redistricting 
by elected officials is, by definition, the use of public office to entrench those 
officials’ (and their party’s) power.  And elected officials in gerrymandered 
districts become less accountable to their constituents than to the party 
officials who control the boundaries.42 
In a casebook on corruption, gerrymandering thus amply earns its place.  
But its inclusion in this context also serves to make a larger point: corruption 
and its regulation are systemic challenges.  If regulation at the back end 
(criminal liability) and the front (campaign finance) has been limited, the 
only regulatory modality remaining in the system is elections themselves: 
voters will oust the bad apples at the polls.  Yet for the election modality of 
corruption regulation to work, voters must actually choose their elected 
officials.  In gerrymandered districts, the converse is true.43 
The remaining chapters of the book examine more discrete issues within 
corruption law.  Chapter Four is devoted to corporate corruption abroad and 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.44  Chapter Five revisits in more depth the 
unique challenges of investigating and prosecuting public corruption first 
highlighted in Chapter One, focusing in particular on the thorny problems 
inherent in investigation of corruption in police departments, the military, the 
United States Congress and, finally, the President (with a study of the 
Watergate prosecution).45  The timeliness of the Watergate coverage hardly 
 
40  SORENSEN & HOFFMAN, supra note 6, at 477–80 (discussing Caperton v. A.T. Massey 
Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) (upholding a prohibition on contributions and expenditures to 
a judge by litigants in a case pending before that judge); Williams-Yulee v. The Fla. Bar, 135 
S. Ct. 1656 (2015) (upholding Florida’s ban on personal solicitation of campaign funds by 
judicial candidates). 
41  The Court will revisit the question this term in Gill v. Whitford, 137 S. Ct. 2266 (No. 
16-1161), and Benisek v. Lamone, 136 S. Ct. 543 (No. 17-333). 
42  SORENSEN & HOFFMAN, supra note 6, at 480.  See also Samuel Issacharoff, 
Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593, 597 (2002) (describing 
gerrymandering as “insider manipulation of the process for partisan gain,” and diagnosing a 
“failure of constitutional law to ensure the competitive vitality of the political process”). 
43  Issacharoff, supra note 42. 
44  15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (1996); SORENSEN & HOFFMAN, supra note 6, at ch. 4. 
45  Id. at ch. 5. 
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bears mention,46 and it seems certain that future editions of the book (which 
was published before the outcome of the 2016 election) will contain updated 
materials on such topics as the Emoluments Clause,47 the conflicts-of-interest 
and anti-nepotism laws governing executive branch officials,48 and the 
scandal that birthed a custom—but not a legal requirement—that presidents 
disclose their federal tax returns.49 
The book concludes in Chapter Six with a deeper exploration of the 
philosophical debates around corruption.  It offers a series of readings that 
collectively theorize corruption through a variety of perspectives—
economic, moral, cultural, and constitutional.50  Through these readings, 
students will be challenged to think about what, precisely, makes corruption 
a societal problem, how a society’s own values and governance structure 
influences the extent to which corruption is, in fact, a problem, and how these 
factors affect how we ultimately choose to define corruption. 
II. TEACHING PUBLIC CORRUPTION HOLISTICALLY 
Some scholars have likened corruption to hydraulic processes: if 
 
46  Peter Baker, In Trump’s Firing of James Comey, Echoes of Watergate, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/09/us/politics/trump-fbi-investigation-
nixon.html?_r=0; Jon Marshall, 7 differences between Trump turmoil and Watergate, CHI. 
TRIB. (May 23, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/commentary/ct-
watergate-trump-investigations-differences-perspec-0524-md-20170523-story.html. 
47  Norman Eisen, Richard Painter & Lawrence H. Tribe, The Emoluments Clause: Its Text, 
Meaning, and Application to Donald J. Trump, BROOKINGS INST. (Dec. 16, 2016), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/gs_121616_emoluments-clause1. 
pdf.  
48  Shaub, supra note 5; J. Jackson Walter, The Ethics in Government Act, Conflict of 
Interest Laws and Presidential Recruiting, 41 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 659 (1981).  
49  See Joseph J. Thorndike, JCT Investigation of Nixon’s Tax Returns (Feb. 2016), 
http://uschs.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/USCHS-History-Role-Joint-Committee-
Taxation-Thorndike.pdf (unpublished manuscript prepared for United States Capitol 
Historical Society, program on The History and Role of the Joint Committee: the Joint 
Committee and Tax History) (detailing history of President Nixon’s $476,431 tax dodge, press 
reports of which led to a federal investigation, Nixon’s ultimate disclosure of his returns, and 
his infamous statement to the American public—ultimately proven false by the tax 
investigation—that “I am not a crook”); Mark A. Patterson, Many public officials must share 
their tax returns. Why not the president?,  WASH. POST (Aug. 17, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/many-public-officials-must-share-their-tax-
returns-why-not-the-president/2016/08/17/196e2b8c-63f2-11e6-be4e-23fc4d4d12b4 
_story.html (discussing absence of law requiring disclosure of President’s tax returns).  
50  SORENSEN & HOFFMAN, supra note 6, at ch. 6 (surveying the writings of, among others, 
Richard A. Posner on the economics of corruption; John T. Noonan, Jr. on the intellectual 
history of anti-bribery law; Lawrence Lessig on the culture of corruption bred by elected 
officials’ dependence on campaign funding; and Zephyr Teachout on the “anti-corruption 
principle” embedded in the U.S. Constitution).  
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regulators seek to dam one stream of corrupt influence, it will simply find 
another opening.51  Others have applied the hydraulic analogy to anti-
corruption enforcement, observing that “if you dam up one source of reform, 
you flood the other sources.”52  Here, I want to tweak the analogy somewhat: 
systemic deregulation is also a hydraulic process.  As each regulatory 
pathway in a system is limited or blocked, the pressure mounts on the 
remaining ones—until the last is lifted and corruption finally gushes freely, 
without constraint. 
This is our current predicament.  Criminal law has been limited 
substantially by the Court as a regulatory tool.  It now serves only to constrain 
the most blatant form of graft—the quid pro quo; and because of the high 
burden of proof in criminal cases and the difficulties inherent in investigating 
such cases, its practical efficacy is further limited to the most extreme and 
obvious scenarios.53 Campaign finance regulation would seem to be the 
obvious antidote to criminal law’s regulatory shortcomings: it prevents 
corruption at the front-end by limiting the financial benefits influence-
peddlers could confer on public officials.  Yet the Court has hobbled 
campaign finance regulation in service of free speech.54 
This leaves elections themselves as a regulatory bulwark.  As Sorensen 
and Hoffman correctly note, elections are “a key—perhaps the key—anti-
corruption mechanism in a democracy.”55  That is, voters believing their 
elected officials have been bought can oust them at the polls.  Yet this 
regulatory option has likewise been limited—not so much by the courts as by 
the elected officials themselves, who have manipulated the districting process 
to shield themselves from electoral accountability.56 To these corrupting 
influences on the electoral process I would add another (which is not covered 
in the book but made prominent in the 2016 election): the dissemination by 
interest groups (and foreign powers) of political propaganda.57  Such 
 
51  See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance 
Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1708 (1998). 
52  Shugerman, supra note 1, at 409 (discussing how the Court’s resistance to campaign 
finance regulation has left prosecutors to pick up the regulatory slack, resulting in 
prosecutorial overreaching in a number of cases). 
53  See supra notes 26–30 and accompanying text. 
54  See supra notes 31–35 and accompanying text. 
55  SORENSEN & HOFFMAN, supra note 6, at 2. 
56  See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text.  Whether the Court this term jettisons 
its traditional reluctance to curtail partisan (as opposed to race-based) gerrymandering remains 
to be see.  Supra note 41. 
57  Craig Timberg, Russian propaganda effort helped spread ‘fake news’ during election, 
experts say, WASH. POST (Nov. 24, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/ 
economy/russian-propaganda-effort-helped-spread-fake-news-during-election-experts-
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propaganda is corrupting, to be sure; it is also, practically speaking, difficult 
to curtail, and in any event most likely protected (as to dissemination by 
American persons) by the First Amendment.58 
The pathways to effective regulation of corrupting influence, in short, 
have nearly all been blocked.  It should not be entirely surprising, then, that 
in 2016, the United States Presidential election was defined largely as a 
contest between entrenched, corrupted power and disruptive, outside 
change;59 that paradoxically, the winner of that contest maintains financial 
and business holdings presenting unprecedented conflicts of interest and 
potential for corruption;60 that in the 2016 election cycle, combined political 
expenditures by political parties, outside groups, and donors exceeded $2.1 
billion;61 and that in 2012, the first election after 2010’s multi-state 
redistricting surge, incumbents in Congress benefitted from non-competitive 
races, even in states that had split nearly evenly in that year’s presidential 
race.62  Each of these developments is concerning.  Together, they present 
symptoms of a larger problem: a systemic breakdown of public corruption 
regulation. 
Where do we go from here?  Lost in the prescriptive debate is the single 
most important prerequisite for viable reform: that Americans—including 
American civic leaders—care about the integrity of their public institutions 
and understand regulation’s importance in maintaining it. 
As scholars, we can and should endeavor to make this case.  But our 
more influential contribution here is as teachers.  Law schools not only 
educate the next generation of lawyers; they mold the next generation of civic 




58  Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1987) (upholding a statute requiring that foreign 
political propaganda be labeled as such) is not to the contrary. The case held that the labeling 
requirement did not restrain the exercise of a film distributor’s free speech rights; if it had, the 
act presumably would be unconstitutional.  
59  See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
60  See Schaub, supra note 5; Venook, supra note 5. 
61  This data comes from the Center for Responsive Politics, a nonpartisan, nonprofit 
research group, based on compilations of filings with the Federal Election Commission.  2016 
Presidential Race: Summary, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., https://www.opensecrets.org 
/pres16 (last visited Jan. 16, 2018).  
62  See Sundeep Iyer, Redistricting and Congressional Control Following the 2012 
Election, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Nov. 28, 2012), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/ 
default/files/analysis/Redistricting_Post_2012.pdf; Mike Maciag, Analysis: Redistricting 
Mostly Protected Incumbents in 2012 Congressional Races, GOVERNING (Nov. 16, 2012), 
http://www.governing.com/blogs/by-the-numbers/redistricting-gerrymandering-effect-2012-
congressional-elections.html. 
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imperative of restraining it, we must begin by giving public corruption law 
the curricular attention it deserves.  This means, at a minimum, teaching 
public corruption as a stand-alone course that examines the full panoply of 
regulatory modalities—criminal, civil, electoral—and efforts to displace 
them. 
Few law schools do.  Of the 225 ABA-accredited law schools that make 
course offerings publicly available on their websites, just ten appear to offer 
what could arguably be considered a holistic, domestically-focused public 
corruption course.63  A larger number of schools offer courses covering 
discrete topics in corruption, such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, or 
global corruption, or white-collar crime, or campaign finance and election 
law.  But the vast majority of law students today will complete their legal 
education without any understanding of public corruption as a systemic 
regulatory challenge.  This is a serious omission. 
Fortunately, it is one easily remedied.  For professors who might 
consider teaching a wide-ranging public corruption course, Sorensen and 
Hoffman’s new book lowers the bar to entry, as it obviates the need to 
compile one’s own materials from disparate sources.  Of course, the book 
also is a useful resource for those teaching discrete courses on, for instance, 
criminal corruption prosecutions or global corruption law.  But offering such 
discrete courses without also offering a holistic course on public corruption 
and the law is, I believe, a curricular shortcoming.  As law schools and law 
professors, we have a special responsibility to inculcate in the next generation 
of civic leaders an understanding of, and appreciation for, public corruption 
as a regulatory challenge.  By meeting this responsibility, we can help ensure 
our civic institutions of the future are stronger than those of the present. 
 
63  These include the law schools at the University of Denver, Fordham University, the 
University of Michigan, Temple University, Hofstra University, George Washington 
University, the University of Chicago, Northwestern University, the University of 
Pennsylvania, and Rutgers University.  (It is perhaps not a coincidence that of the ten schools, 
seven are in either the Chicago, New York, or Philadelphia metro area, all cities with long 
histories of public corruption.)  
 A brief explication of survey methodology is in order.  There are 230 ABA-accredited law 
schools in the United States.  Of these, 225 maintain full course listings and descriptions on 
their websites. (The missing five are the University of Arkansas, Fayetteville; the University 
of Arkansas, Little Rock; Georgia State University; Pontifical Catholic of Puerto Rico; and 
Puerto Rico University.)  Under my supervision, my research assistant reviewed the course 
listings for the 225 law schools and searched within them using the terms “corrupt*,” 
“compliance,” “foreign corrupt*,” and “campaign.”  All available course listings were 
searched.  While for the vast majority of schools this included multiple years, for others it 
included only the 2017–18 year; therefore, missed through this survey method would be 
schools publishing only courses for the current year which did not offer a public corruption 
class in the current year, but do offer it biennially or triennially. 
